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To Discovery and Beyond: A 
Comprehensive Look at Argentina’s Data 
Protection Laws 
Sean McCleary* 
This article strives to shed light on the interplay between 
discovery practice under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, Argentina's data protection laws, and the ever-present 
possibility of discovery sanctions. For all intents and pur-
poses, data protections laws serve as a double-edged sword 
that seek to protect an individual's privacy; however, data 
protection laws were not designed with litigation in mind. 
And because of that, it can be difficult for an Argentine com-
pany to comply with a discovery request that would impli-
cate an individual's data privacy under Argentine law. In the 
end, it comes down to a balancing test. This article will ex-
plore the origins of data protections laws, the data protec-
tions laws in Argentina, discovery practice under the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, and how Argentina's data pro-
tection laws can significantly impact discovery practice. 
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I.     INTRODUCTION 
The rise of cross-border transactions has been met with a rise in 
cross-border litigation. As American companies have increased 
business activity in Latin America and the European Union (“EU”) 
they have also encountered data protection laws. When compared to 
other Latin American countries, Argentina presents a unique situa-
tion because it has comprehensive data protection laws that are sim-
ilar to those in the EU1 Additionally, Argentina and the U.S. have a 
trade relationship that is valued at $24.2 billion USD annually.2 As 
globalization has accelerated in the past twenty years, it has become 
increasingly common for a U.S. party to file a domestic lawsuit 
against a foreign party.3 The majority of these lawsuits are breach of 
contract actions. Almost inevitably, the involved parties will be-
come immersed in pre-trial discovery. 
                                                                                                             
 1 Aldo M. Leiva, Data Protection Law in Spain and Latin America: Survey 
of Legal Approaches, 41 INT’L LAW NEWS 4, available at http://www.ameri-
canbar.org/publications/international_law_news/2012/fall/data_protec-
tion_law_spain_latin_america_survey_legal_approaches.html. 
 2 U.S. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE, Doing Business in Argentina, EXPORT.GOV 
(Oct. 23, 2015, 10:10 AM), http://export.gov/Argentina/doingbusinessinargentin 
a/index.asp. 
 3 See Lawyers for Civ. Justice et al., Litigation Cost Survey of Major Com-
panies, 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation at Duke Law School (May 10-11, 
2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-archives-
rules-committees/special-projects-rules-committees/2010-civil 
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Pre-trial discovery is the “formal process of exchanging infor-
mation between the parties about the witnesses and evidence [they 
will] present at trial.”4 Traditional discovery involved the exchange 
of hard-copy files and data. Today, discovery is increasingly con-
ducted through the electronic exchange of information, a process 
known as e-discovery.5 In many cases, pre-trial discovery may be 
outcome-determinative for either party. 
Because many foreign jurisdictions have varying standards for 
the scope of pre-trial discovery, it is likely that many documents will 
be protected under either a blocking statute or a data privacy or data 
protection law.6 The U.S. has permissive discovery standards com-
pared not only to civil law regimes in the EU, but also to many Latin 
American countries such as Argentina.7 What is largely considered 
standard pre-trial discovery in the U.S. is likely to be considered an 
invasion of privacy in the EU and Argentina. Many, if not most, EU 
members consider U.S. discovery standards to be invasive because 
EU members consider data privacy to be a fundamental right.8 Par-
adoxically, although America has always placed a high value on pri-
vacy, its legal system encourages broad discovery procedures. Per-
haps it is because pre-trial discovery is seen as an efficient way to 
                                                                                                             
 4 AM. BAR ASS’N DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC., How Courts Work, 
AMERICANBAR.ORG, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/reso 
urces/law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/discovery.html (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2016). 
 5 Id. 
 6 Seth D. Rothman & Charles W. Cohen, The Impact on U.S. Discovery of 
EU Data Protection and Discovery Blocking Statutes, HUGHES HUBBARD (Janu-
ary 2013), http://www.hugheshubbard.com/Documents/Impact%20on%20U%20 
S%20%20Discov-
ery%20of%20EU%20Data%20Protection%20and%20Discovery%20Blocking%
20Statutes.pdf (“‘Blocking Statutes’ are statutes which prohibit the transfer of 
data for use in foreign proceedings unless the transfer complies with the Hague 
Evidence Convention.”). 
 7 William D. Wood & Brian C. Boyle, Obtaining Foreign Discovery in U.S. 
Litigation, 63 THE ADVOC. (Texas) 12 (2013). 
 8 Council Directive No. 95/46/EC, O.J. L 281/31 (1995), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-
46_part1_en.pdf. [hereinafter, EU Directive]. 
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“encourage early disclosure and efficient settlement prior to trial.”9 
Pre-trial discovery has even been vaunted as a means to provide “in-
formational equity.”10 By contrast, in many civil law countries, dis-
covery is a function that is best carried out by judges.11 In their eyes, 
discovery is best carried out by the only person in the case whose 
duty is to be impartial. 
This note has two aims: (1) to shed light on the labyrinth of dis-
covery problems in Argentina and (2) to illustrate the impact that 
data protection laws have on U.S. entities conducting business in 
Argentina. For the purposes of highlighting the various discovery 
problems that may arise under Argentina’s data protection laws, this 
note will explore the following hypothetical situations: (1) A lawsuit 
was filed in the U.S., thereby invoking U.S. discovery standards and 
(2) the Defendant was an Argentine party that has discoverable data 
in a physical or electronic form (electronically stored information or 
“ESI”). 
Part I of this note will provide a cursory understanding of the 
procedures for conducting cross-border discovery under U.S. dis-
covery standards. In Part I, I will first examine the Hague Evidence 
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, as well as the prob-
lems associated with its interpretation. Part II of this note will dis-
cuss how data protection laws have impacted the ability of litigants 
to conduct discovery. Much of this discussion will center around the 
EU Directive (hereinafter, “Directive”) and the Directive’s influ-
ence on other nations to adopt data protection laws. Part III will spe-
cifically analyze the Directive’s influence on Argentina’s legisla-
ture, which prompted the country to create its own data protection 
                                                                                                             
 9 See Marissa L. P. Caylor, Modernizing the Hague Evidence Convention: A 
Proposed Solution to Cross-Border Discovery Conflicts During Civil and Com-
mercial Litigation, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 341, 363, 364-68 (2010), for further discus-
sion on why pre-trial discovery in civil law countries is uncommon. 
 10 See generally STEPHEN N. SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, 
PRACTICE AND CONTEXT, 388-418 (3d ed. 2008) (explaining basic rules of dis-
covery). 
 11 Benjamin L. Klein, Trust, Respect, and Cooperation May Keep Us Out of 
Jail: A Practical Guide to Navigating the European Union Privacy Directive’s 
Restrictions on American Discovery Procedure, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 623, 
625 (2012) (See 625-28 for further discussion on the tensions between the U.S. 
and EU discovery dilemma.). 
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laws. Additionally, Part III will discuss the problems that Argen-
tina’s data protection laws present to U.S. litigators, which are sim-
ilar to the problems that litigators face when dealing with European 
entities. Finally, Part IV will discuss some of the proposed solutions 
to resolve issues with cross-border discovery. 
II.     UNDERSTANDING THE GRAND SCHEME OF THINGS: U.S. 
DISCOVERY ABROAD 
When domestic and foreign litigants enter pre-trial discovery in 
a U.S. jurisdiction, the court has options to mandate the foreign en-
tity to either freeze or to produce discoverable materials. Under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter, “FRCP”), a litigant 
may request unprivileged data that is “relevant to the claim or de-
fense of any party.”12 In the past 15 years, e-discovery has been at 
the forefront of pre-trial discovery for civil litigation. Because we 
are moving further towards a paperless world, I will focus most of 
the discussion on e-discovery versus traditional discovery. 
The following provides a brief understanding of e-discovery: a 
party transfers data to a vendor, which results in the creation of thou-
sands, if not millions, of pages of information. In order to narrow 
the amount of relevant data, the information may be sorted and fil-
tered by either a simple keyword search, “boolean search,” or 
through “predictive coding.”13 Predictive coding is a computer-as-
sisted search function that has only recently been permitted by 
courts.14 It can be cost-effective because it can process large vol-
umes of data with minimal input by those that are searching the 
data.15 
                                                                                                             
 12 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 13 Michael Lopresti, What is Predictive Coding?: Including eDiscovery Ap-
plications, KM WORLD (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.kmworld.com/Articles/Edi-
torial/What-Is- . . . /What-is-Predictive-Coding-Including-eDiscovery-Applica-
tions-87108.aspx. 
 14 See Global Aerospace Inc., v. Landow Aviation, L.P., Case No. CL 61040 
(Va. Cir. Ct. 2012). 
 15 See Lopresti, supra note 13. 
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A. Hague Evidence Convention and the U.S.’s Disdain for it 
Prior to 1987, U.S. litigants seeking to request evidence from a 
foreign entity were constrained by the Hague Evidence Convention 
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad (hereinafter, “Hague Conven-
tion”).16 The Hague Convention was established in order to “recon-
cile the differing legal philosophies of the Civil Law, Common Law, 
and other systems with regard to taking evidence.”17 The Hague 
Convention, which the U.S. and Argentina are both parties to, allows 
states seeking evidence to send a Letter of Request to the state in 
which the evidence is located.18 Article 1 of the Hague Convention 
allows U.S. litigants to obtain evidence from foreign witnesses 
much to the same extent that the litigant would be able to obtain that 
evidence in the U.S.19 
Soon after the Hague Convention was established, it began to 
unravel at the seams—in one fell swoop, the Convention allowed 
countries to opt-out of pre-trial discovery.20 Per Article 23, the 
Hague Convention allowed signatory nations to sign a limiting res-
ervation that would disallow the execution of Letters of Request for 
purposes of pre-trial discovery.21 Argentina has exercised this right 
and it has disallowed pre-trial discovery under the Hague Conven-
tion, forcing litigants to search for an alternative means to make pre-
trial discovery requests.22 Despite its aspirational attempt to create a 
unified and global system for requesting evidence from abroad, 
many have argued that the Hague Convention has failed to achieve 
                                                                                                             
 16 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of 
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 541 (1987) [hereinafter Aerospatiale]. 
 17 See Caylor, supra note 9, at 344 (quoting Société Nationale Industrielle 
Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring)). 
 18 Argentina was not an original party to the Convention, but it ratified the 
Convention on May 8, 1987. See The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evi-
dence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555 
T.I.A.S. 7444 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. 
 19 Caylor, supra note 9, at 344. 
 20 See id. at 344-46 (noting that the addition of Limiting Reservations defeats 
the purpose of the Hague Convention). 
 21 David W. Ogden & Sarah G. Rapawy, Discovery in Transnational Litiga-
tion: Procedures and Procedural Issues, ABA Business Law Section Spring 
Meeting, 2007, at 12, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/newsletter 
/0058/materials/pp1.pdf. 
 22 Id. 
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its goal.23Arguably, the Hague Convention failed because of its ea-
gerness to please European constituents. 
Realizing its lack of utility, U.S. courts needed a solution to cir-
cumvent the Hague Convention for a number of reasons. In addition 
to the execution of limiting reservations, other features of the Hague 
Convention also proved to be time-consuming. Letters of Request 
often take a considerable amount of time to process and, in many 
cases, they prove to be fruitless.24 As a result, critics of the Hague 
Convention point out that it is poorly suited for the U.S.’s globalized 
economy.25 The need for efficient discovery is ever-present in a 
world where cross-border litigation is commonplace. 
The U.S. Supreme Court added the final nail in the Hague Con-
vention’s proverbial coffin by deeming its use discretionary.26 In 
1987, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Societe Nationale Industri-
elle Aerospatiale (hereinafter, “Aerospatiale”) that the Hague Con-
vention was not the exclusive means for gathering evidence abroad: 
the FRCP could be applied as well.27 Here, litigants dissuaded by 
the Hague Convention’s limiting reservations were offered an alter-
native avenue for making pre-trial discovery requests in countries 
                                                                                                             
 23 See Caylor, supra note 9, at 372 (“The Hague Convention’s inability to 
keep pace with globalization and its lengthy processing times have made it inef-
fective.”). 
 24 See id. 
 25 See Moze Cowper & Amor Esteban, E-Discovery, Privacy, and the Trans-
fer of Data Across Borders: Proposed Solutions for Cutting the Gordian Knot, 10 
SEDONA CONF. J. 263, 272 (2009) (discussing why the Hague Convention on the 
taking evidence from abroad is anachronistic). 
 26 This was a personal injury case stemming from a plane crash in Iowa. The 
French government owned the corporations that made the planes. The victims 
filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The 
parties initially conducted discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
but the defendants filed a motion for a protective order claiming that the Federal 
Rules are not applicable because the information sought was in France. The dis-
trict court denied the motion. Upon appeal, the Eight Circuit affirmed. The case 
reached the Supreme Court with the question of to what extent to which a federal 
district court must employ the procedures set forth in the Hague Convention when 
litigants seek answers to interrogatories, the production of documents, and admis-
sions from a French adversary over whom the court has personal jurisdiction. The 
Supreme Court ruled that the Hague Convention is not the exclusive means of 
obtaining evidence from a foreign litigant, and the Hague Convention does not 
need to be used first. See Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 541. 
 27 See id. 
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that signed limiting reservations. The Court stated that the Hague 
Convention is “a permissive supplement, not a pre-emptive replace-
ment, for other means of obtaining evidence abroad.”28 The Court 
concluded by establishing a five-factor balancing test for judges to 
use when determining whether it is appropriate to apply the FRCP. 
The factors to be weighed are as follows: 
(1) the importance to the . . . litigation of the docu-
ments or other information requested; (2) the degree 
of specificity of the request; (3) whether the infor-
mation originated in the United States; (4) the avail-
ability of alternative means of securing the infor-
mation; and (5) the extent to which noncompliance 
with the request would undermine important inter-
ests of the United States, or compliance with the re-
quest would undermine important interests of the 
state where the information is located.29 
Adding insult to injury, the Supreme Court stated that any man-
datory application of the Hague Convention would undermine U.S. 
legal proceedings.30 Just as the Hague Convention catered to the 
countries that wanted to avoid pre-trial discovery, the Supreme 
Court catered to U.S. litigants that needed to engage in it for pur-
poses of developing their case. U.S. courts have also ruled that the 
FRCP can be applied in jurisdictional discovery.31 
It is worth noting that, although the Hague Convention has been 
disfavored by U.S. courts, it is still widely used by other countries.32 
In defense of the Hague Convention, while it may be ineffective for 
pre-trial discovery and it may require a lengthy wait for a response, 
it does promote international cooperation.33 Further, much of pre-
trial discovery’s purpose is to promote cooperation between oppos-
                                                                                                             
 28 Id. at 536. 
 29 Id. at 544. 
 30 See Caylor, supra note 9, at 346-48. 
 31 See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d 45, 50 (D.D.C. 2000). 
 32 James A.R. Nafziger, Another Look at the Hague Evidence Convention Af-
ter Aerospatiale, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 103, 114 (2003). 
 33 See id. 
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ing litigants. Additionally, the Convention has been useful for coun-
tries that have similar data privacy laws.34 If two countries have 
signed limiting reservations under Article 23, then conducting cross-
border discovery between the two countries should be fairly predict-
able because both countries have opted out of using Letters of Re-
quest in pre-trial discovery. 
III.     EU DIRECTIVE: A MODEL FOR DATA PROTECTION 
EVERYWHERE 
In 1995, the European Commission adopted the EU Directive. 
The Directive was aimed at harmonizing divergent data protection 
regimes among EU member states in order to remove obstacles to 
the free flow of information and at “protect[ing] fundamental rights 
and freedoms, notably the right to privacy,” by establishing mini-
mum safeguards for the use of personal data.35 
Prior to the Directive, the EU was scattered with varying data 
protection laws.36 Data protection laws in some form or another 
have existed in Europe since at least 1970.37 To help effectuate the 
goal of harmonization, the EU Directive creates obligations for data 
controllers38 and data processors.39 An example of the relationship 
between a data processor and data controller would be the relation-
ship that exists between a corporation and the company that per-
forms its payroll services.40 The corporation is the data controller 
                                                                                                             
 34 Id. 
 35 EU Directive, supra note 8. 
 36 Chuan Sun, The European Union Privacy Directive and Its Impact on the 
U.S. Privacy Protection Policy: A Year 2003 Perspective, 2 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 99, 100 (2003). 
 37 Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions 
and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1969 (2013). 
 38 The EU Directive defines “controller” as “the person or entity that deter-
mines, alone or jointly with others, the purposes and the means of the processing 
of personal data.” See EU Directive, supra note 8. 
 39 See id. 
 40 Bridget Treacy, Working Party confirms ‘controller’ and ‘processor’ dis-
tinction, HUNTON AND WILLIAMS, (Feb. 15, 2014), http://www.hunton.com/f 
iles/Publication/8fe272d1-d29c-4abd-85ae-17843d084da3/Presentation/Publicati 
onAttachment/6d1be60b-be7d-413c-bd6f-6ee37c02c631/Treacy_controller-proc 
essor_distinctions.pdf. 
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because it is providing the scope to which its payroll company, its 
data processor, can process the corporation’s data41. 
The EU Directive also acts to enforce individuals’ rights.42 Per-
sonal data is defined as “any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person.”43 Put more simply, personal data can be 
information that relates to, among other characteristics, a person’s 
physical, psychological, mental, or cultural traits.44 The Directive’s 
definition of personal data is extremely broad in scope. Due to the 
Directive’s numerous data safeguards, the flow of information from 
EU states to the U.S. is greatly hindered—the Directive prohibits the 
transfer of data to a third country unless that country has adopted 
adequate data protection laws.45 
Argentina is one of a few countries outside of the EU that has 
been deemed to have adequate data protection laws under the Di-
rective’s standard.46 Because of its closely aligned data protection 
laws, one would expect that data transfers between the EU and an 
entity in Argentina would be easier than data transfers between en-
tities with discordant data protection schemes, such as a transfer be-
tween the U.S. and Argentina. 
A. Data Transfers under the EU Directive 
The following represents three circumstances where data trans-
fers are permitted under the EU Directive: (1) when there is consent 
by the data subject; (2) when it is necessary to meet a legal obliga-
tion; or (3) when it is necessary for the purposes of a legitimate in-
terest.47 However, these transfers are not intended for litigation pur-
poses. 
Consent can be required in many circumstances. For example, 
consent will likely be required when there is a request to retain data 
for longer than local laws allow.48 Obtaining valid consent can be 
                                                                                                             
 41 See id. 
 42 See Chuan Sun, supra note 36, at 7. 
 43 EU Directive, supra note 8. 
 44 See id. 
 45 See id. 
 46 See Maxim Gakh, Argentina’s Protection of Personal Data: Initiation and 
Response, 2 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 781, 782 (2006). 
 47 EU Directive, supra note 8. 
 48 Id. 
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challenging, particularly when dealing with a customer’s infor-
mation. For one, if the discovery request implicates the data of thou-
sands of individuals, it is not reasonable for a company to request 
permission to process data from each customer, be it personal or 
sensitive. Of course, companies could request consent from custom-
ers as part of a business transaction—waivers are commonplace in 
modern business transactions. Under Argentina’s data protection 
laws, consent is not necessary when it arises out of a contractual 
relationship.49 In many cases, receiving consent is either too expen-
sive or too time consuming. Because Argentina and EU members 
have a greater affinity for data privacy and protection, they will 
likely have lower expectation as to the quantity of potentially dis-
coverable data. 
Argentina is one of many countries outside of Europe that views 
data privacy as a fundamental right. As mentioned above, its data 
protection statutes have been deemed adequate, thereby meeting the 
EU Directive’s standard.50 This allows for data to flow more freely 
between Argentina and EU members.51 In contrast, many foreign 
entities, particularly European countries, are hesitant to store data in 
the U.S. because of relatively permissive laws on data privacy.52 
B. Safe-Harbor Program 
After the EU directive was implemented, the Department of 
Commerce acted quickly to prevent a complete bulwark of data 
transfer between the EU and the U.S.53 Realistically, neither the U.S. 
                                                                                                             
 49 See PROTECCIÓN DE LOS DATOS PERSONALES [PERSONAL DATA 
PROTECTION ACT], Ley 25.326, Nov. 2, 2000 BOLETÍN OFICIAL [B.O.] 1 (Arg.) 
available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un-dpadm/u 
npan044147.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2014) [hereinafter “PDPA”]. 
 50 See Gakh, supra note 46, at 781-82. 
 51 See id. at 783. 
 52 Following Edward Snowden’s leak, details over the NSA’s access to cloud 
computing sources has continued to deter non-U.S. companies from storing data 
in the U.S. See Andrea Peterson, NSA Snooping Could Cost U.S. Tech Companies 
$35 Billion over Three Years, WASHINGTON POST, (Feb. 12, 2014, 10:46 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/07/ns 
a-snooping-could-cost-u-s-tech-companies-35-billion-over-three-years/. 
 53 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, Safe Harbor, EXPORT.GOV (Feb. 15, 2014), 
http://www.export.gov/ 
safeharbor/. 
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nor the EU could survive in the absence of one another’s economy.54 
In order to take initiative, the Department of Commerce established 
a Safe-Harbor program to help facilitate data transfers.55 Under the 
Safe-Harbor program, which was approved by the EU in 2000, U.S. 
companies that maintained certain privacy policies would be 
deemed to have an adequate level of protection.56 A downside to the 
Safe-Harbor program is that U.S. companies have had to cope with 
increased costs in maintaining adequate privacy policies.57 The 
Safe-Harbor program was specifically designed and implemented in 
order to keep trade and commerce flowing—thus, it was not de-
signed to aid litigants’ discovery requests.58 Initially, the program 
was unsuccessful.59 Within a few years of its implementation, fewer 
than 500 companies had joined the program.60 One significant rea-
son for the program’s lack of success was because of policy changes 
that followed its creation.61 Contrary to what one might believe, fol-
lowing the attacks on September 11, 2001, the U.S. did not tighten 
data protection; instead, the U.S. legislature made it easier for the 
government to access data.62 Meanwhile in the EU, data protection 
was getting stricter.63 These diverging policies made it difficult for 
U.S. companies to comply with the program. 
                                                                                                             
 54 See William H. Cooper, EU-U.S. Economic Ties: Framework, Scope, and 
Magnitude, CRS REPORT, (March 20, 2009). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Gakh, supra note 46, at 783-84. 
 57 See Chuan Sun, supra note 36, at 100. 
 58 See id. at 104 (discussing several ways that business can be disrupted be-
tween the EU and the U.S. in the absence of a data transfer scheme such as the 
Safe-Harbor Program). 
 59 See id. at 110 (only twenty companies had joined the program within three 
months of its implementation). 
 60 See id. 
 61 See id. at 109. 
 62 See generally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropri-
ate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered titles of 
U.S.C.). 
 63 See Chuan Sun, supra note 36, at 109; see Council Directive 2002/58, 2002 
O.J. (L 201) 1 (EC). 
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IV.     ARGENTINA’S PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION ACT 
Argentina is a pioneer in the field of data protection by being the 
first country in Latin America to adopt comprehensive data protec-
tion laws.64 Argentina took initiative by adopting data protection 
laws modeled after Spain’s data protection laws.65 Argentina’s cod-
ification of data protection is the Personal Data Protection Act (here-
inafter, “PDPA”) No. 25.326.66 The purpose of the PDPA is to im-
plement Argentina’s constitutional guarantees to data privacy.67 
Specifically, the Act reads as follows: 
The purpose of this Act is the full protection of per-
sonal information recorded in data files, registers, 
banks or other technical means of data-treatment, ei-
ther public or private for purposes of providing re-
ports, in order to guarantee the honor and intimacy 
of persons, as well as the access to the information 
that may be recorded about such persons, in accord-
ance with the provisions of Section 43, Third Para-
graph of the National Constitution.68 
The PDPA guarantees individuals’ rights and protections under 
the law and affords them access to their data.69 As stated, the law 
applies to both public and private persons and legal entities that own 
databases.70 In summary, the PDPA regulates data users’ ability to 
process personal or sensitive data.71 
There are striking similarities between the PDPA and the EU 
Directive. Specifically, Argentina and the EU share almost identical 
                                                                                                             
 64 See Gakh, supra note 46, for a more comprehensive understanding of the 
differences in data protection between the U.S., Europe, and Latin America; An-
drés Guadamuz, Habeas Data: The Latin American Response to Data Protection, 
2001 J. INFO. L. & TECH. 3, https://www2.warwick. 
ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2000_2/guadamuz/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2006). 
 65 John C. Eustice & Marc Alain Bohn, Navigating the Gauntlet: A Survey of 
Data Privacy Laws in Three Key Latin American Countries, 14 SEDONA CONF. J. 
137, 138 (2013). 
 66 See PDPA, supra note 49. 
 67 See id. § 1. 
 68 Id. (emphasis added). 
 69 See id. 
 70 See id. § 2. 
 71 See id. 
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definitions of “data.”72 Under the PDPA, “personal data” is defined 
as “information of any kind referred to certain or ascertainable phys-
ical persons or legal entities.”73 Sensitive Data, which receives a 
higher degree of protection, is defined as “personal data revealing 
racial and ethnic origin, political opinions, religious, philosophical 
or moral beliefs, labor union membership, and information concern-
ing health conditions or sexual habits or behavior.”74 The PDPA reg-
ulates “data users”75 and “data owner[s].”76 Under the PDPA, citi-
zens are given wide latitude in accessing their own data.77 
A. Citizens’ Right of Action: Habeas Data 
In some instances, the PDPA grants greater data privacy protec-
tion than the laws in Europe and, in particular, the U.S. Argentina 
has afforded its citizens a private right of action known as Habeas 
Data.78 This cause of action falls into a category of constitutional 
rights known as “amparo.”79 The Argentine Constitution was 
amended in 1994 to add a provision dealing with privacy.80 The rel-
evant article of Argentina’s Constitution reads as follows: 
Any person shall file this action to obtain information 
on the data about himself and their purpose, regis-
tered in public records or data bases, or in private 
ones intended to supply information; and in case of 
false data or discrimination, this action may be filed 
to request the suppression, rectification, confidenti-
ality or updating of said data. The secret nature of the 
                                                                                                             
 72 Compare PDPA, supra note 49, with EU Directive, supra note 8. 
 73 PDPA, supra note 49. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. (“Any person, either public or private, performing in its, his or her dis-
cretion the treatment of data contained in files, registers or banks, owned by such 
persons or to which they may have access through a connection.”). 
 76 Id. (“Any physical person or legal entity having a legal domicile or local 
offices or branches in the country, whose data are subject to the treatment referred 
to in this Act.”). 
 77 See id. 
 78 Guadamuz, Habeas Data, supra note 64 at 3, 3.2.4. 
 79 See id. 
 80 See id. 
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sources of journalistic information shall not be im-
paired.81 
Essentially, Habeas Data is a positive right that allows individ-
uals to bring an action to protect their constitutional right to data 
privacy.82 This right to access their information is codified in the 
PDPA as well.83 Habeas Data can prove to be problematic when 
Argentine companies or entities are required to produce ESI that im-
plicates the data privacy rights of countless individuals. On the other 
hand, the amount of people bringing these Habeas Data claims is 
rather low.84 
B. Enforcement and Oversight of the PDPA 
While evidence suggests that enforcement is rather lax, PDPA 
violations still carry severe penalties.85 The Argentine Personal Data 
Protection Agency (hereinafter, “APDPA”) is the agency that over-
sees the PDPA.86 The agency has the power to review complaints 
and the power to initiate investigations on its own.87 Upon finding a 
                                                                                                             
 81 Art. 43, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.), available at 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Argentina/argen94_e.html. 
 82 See Gakh, supra note 46, at 785. 
 83 See PDPA, supra note 49 (“SECTION 33.- Legal Basis of a Complaint - 
The action for the protection of personal data or of habeas data shall be applica-
ble: (a) to acquire knowledge of personal data stored in public or private data files, 
registers or banks intended for the provision of reports, as well as purposes 
thereof; (b) to those cases in which the falsehood, inaccuracy or outdating of the 
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tion is prohibited by this Act, in order to demand their suppression, rectification, 
confidentiality or updating.”). 
 84 See Gakh, supra note 46, at 789-91 (discussing the plaintiff’s heightened 
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rights). 
 85 Only 19 fines were issued between 2005 and mid-2012. It is believed that 
the lack of sanctions is a result of insufficient resources. See Eustice, supra note 
65, at 141. 
 86 Alec Christie, et al., Argentina: Data Protection Laws of the World Hand-
book: Second Edition – Argentina, MONDAQ (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.mon-
daq.com/x/230846/data+protection/Data+Protec-
tion+Laws+of+the+World+Handbook+Second+Edition+Argentina. 
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violation, the agency can impose fines or revoke the data control-
ler’s ability to maintain a database.88 Civil fines include a “warning, 
suspension, or a fine ranging between [$1,000 to $100,000].”89 Ad-
ditionally, there are criminal sanctions for certain intentional acts, 
such as inserting false information into a database.90 Criminal pen-
alties can range from one month to multiple years of imprison-
ment.91 These criminal penalties show how seriously the APDPA 
takes data privacy violations. 
In order for an entity to keep data, its database must be registered 
with the APDPA.92 Regardless of whether it is a public or private 
entity, so long as the entity is not using the data for personal use, it 
must be registered.93 Consent is the key, in most instances, to a data 
controllers’ ability to transfer and process data.94 In some instances, 
consent is not required altogether.95 When personal data is being 
collected, notice must be provided to those whose data is affected.96 
Entities must provide: 
(i) the purpose for which the data is being collected, 
(ii) who may receive the data, (iii) the existence of a 
database, the identity of the data collector and its 
mailing address; (iv) the consequences of providing 
the data, of refusing to do so or of providing inaccu-
rate information; and (v) the data subject’s access, 
rectification and suppression rights.97 
                                                                                                             
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 PDPA, supra note 49, § 32. 
 92 See Christie, supra note 86. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. (“(i) the data is collected from a publicly accessible database, in the 
exercise of government duties, or as a result of a legal obligation, (ii) the database 
is limited to certain basic information, such as name, ID, tax ID, job, birthdate and 
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relationship and is used only in such context, or (iv) the information is provided 
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Central Bank or a tax authority”). 
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Once the data is collected and stored in a database, it must be 
“truthful, adequate, pertinent, and not excessive, be used exclusively 
for the purpose for which it was legally obtained and be deleted on 
completion of that purpose.”98 Depending on the level of security 
that is required, the data controller may have a legal obligation to 
have someone appointed to maintain adequate security.99 Regard-
less, data controllers must maintain an adequate system that notifies 
them of any breaches.100 
In order for personal data to be transferred outside of Argentina, 
several conditions must be met.101 Transferring personal data re-
quires the data owner’s consent as well as the presence of a legiti-
mate interest between the transferring and the receiving parties.102 
Thus, international data transfers are only lawful in a few circum-
stances.103 Under the PDPA, “[t]he treatment of personal data is un-
lawful when the data owner has not given his or her express consent, 
which must be given in writing, or through any other similar means, 
depending on the circumstances.”104 There are separate standards 
for the ability to transfer personal data and sensitive data. Not sur-
prisingly, sensitive data is granted a greater level of protection.105 
Sensitive data can only be collected and utilized when there is a gen-
eral interest authorized by law.106 Examples of sensitive data can be 
                                                                                                             
 98 See Christie, supra note 86. 
 99 See id. 
 100 See id. 
 101 Eustice, supra note 65, at 140. 
 102 See id. 
 103 PDPA, supra note 49, at § 12 (“a) international judicial cooperation; b) 
exchange of medical information, when so required for the treatment of the party 
affected, or in case of an epidemiological survey, provided that it is conducted in 
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or banking transfers, to the extent thereof, and in pursuance of the applicable laws; 
d) when the transfer is arranged within the framework of international treaties 
which the Argentine Republic is a signatory to; e) when the transfer is made for 
international cooperation purposes between intelligence agencies in the fight 
against organized crime, terrorism and drug-trafficking”). 
 104 Id. §5. 
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anything from information that details someone’s racial back-
ground, to information detailing someone’s sexual orientation.107 
Additionally, no person can be compelled to provide sensitive 
data.108 Essentially, sensitive data can only be collected for public 
interest purposes.109 
C. Problems Facing Litigators and Entities under the PDPA 
Despite a seemingly rigid and aspirational data protection law 
scheme, many critics point to flaws in the PDPA.110 Recently, Ar-
gentina’s laws came under fire for three reasons: (1) the PDPA lacks 
any actual enforcement capability; (2) the language of the PDPA has 
not kept up with technological advances; and (3) the penalties for 
violating the law are not as serious as those within the EU111 Com-
bined, these issues have even caused some to critically examine Ar-
gentina’s commitment to data protection.112 In fact, some people do 
not feel that Argentina has adequate data protection as defined under 
the Directive.113 Aside from the PDPA’s technical problems, the law 
has also frustrated many litigators because it aspires to be much 
more than it is; the PDPA attempts to provide far-reaching and com-
prehensive data protection, but it does not provide enough transpar-
ency for litigators to predict whether they will be subject to sanc-
tions.114 
In theory, the PDPA, like the Directive, inevitably impedes the 
flow of information from Argentina to the U.S. Critics of the Di-
rective claimed that strict enforcement of the Directive would hurt 
trans-Atlantic trade.115 The same concerns would apply to trade be-
tween Argentina and any country with inadequate data protection. 
                                                                                                             
 107 Id. §2. 
 108 Id. §7. 
 109 PDPA, supra note 49, §7. 
 110 See Eustice, supra note 65, at 143. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 141-43; see also Enrique M. Stile, The Current Importantce [sic] of 
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Similar to the discovery problems that U.S. litigators face in the 
EU, Argentina’s laws have posed countless issues to U.S. litigators 
as well. One particular problem area concerns the treatment of both 
personal and sensitive data with respect to work emails. In the U.S., 
work emails are not subject to the data protections standards present 
in the EU and Argentina.116 Courts have gone as far as to say that 
the personal emails of company employees were discoverable in lit-
igation.117 Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a company 
may monitor its employees’ phone usage for work-related pur-
poses.118 Thus, in the U.S., work emails are not considered private, 
thereby making them accessible to the employer.119 Therefore, U.S. 
employers would not face many problems when producing emails 
or text messages for discovery requests.120 On the other hand, work 
emails are protected in Argentina.121 If an email contains personal 
or sensitive data, the employer will likely face a roadblock in trying 
to comply with a U.S. discovery request. The data owner will gen-
erally not be forced to consent to its production in litigation.122 In 
many fields of law, emails may form the foundation of a litigant’s 
case. Embedded in an email may be information that is disserving 
to the defendant. In the absence of such emails, it may be difficult 
to establish key elements in a cause of action, making it fatal for a 
plaintiff’s case. On the other hand, if the defendant fails to produce 
the emails, the U.S. court is not likely to respect the privacy rights 
of foreign individuals.123 The court will instruct the jury that the de-
fendant failed to produce documents; the inference that is drawn will 
certainly not be favorable to the defendant124. 
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 116 European employees can deny consent to monitoring programs. See gen-
erally Lothar Determann & Robert Sprague, Intrusive Monitoring: Employee Pri-
vacy Expectations Are Reasonable in Europe, Destroyed in the United States, 26 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 979, 1035 (2011). 
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 121 See PDPA, supra note 49. 
 122 See Christie, supra note 86. 
 123 See City of Ontario, 560 U.S. at 747. 
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Under Argentine law, a party that violates the PDPA may be 
subject both to civil fines and criminal sanctions.125 If the Argentine 
entity fails to produce documents after receiving a discovery re-
quest, the entity will likely face sanctions and other penalties for 
noncompliance. Argentine parties may be willing to produce docu-
ments if it only results in a small fine, but the risk of criminal sanc-
tions is not likely compel someone to produce documents at the re-
quest of a U.S. court.126 After all, how many litigators are willing to 
go to jail for their client? To that end, U.S. courts should be sensitive 
to the dilemma Argentine entities face, and should not be too quick 
to penalize a party who fails to produce documents for fear of crim-
inal sanctions. U.S. courts have instructed the trier of fact to draw 
an adverse inference when the foreign entity fails to produce the 
documents requested during discovery.127 By drawing an adverse 
inference, the trier of fact assumes that the non-producing party is 
hiding damaging information—completely ignoring the possibility 
that a conflict of laws could prevent the party from producing the 
information. 
Once a U.S. litigant has made a discovery request in a U.S. court, 
the Argentine party has to choose between following the request or 
following Argentine law, which generally prohibits the transfer of 
data to countries with inadequate data laws.128 The transfer of data 
out of Argentina will very likely infringe on the data privacy rights 
of individuals who are not a party to the lawsuit. Most likely, the 
data rights of employees and customers will be affected. This is 
where a fundamental conflict occurs. Courts must decide whether to 
order the production of data or to respect the domestic data privacy 
laws of the foreign country. 
In a landmark case on foreign litigants’ noncompliance with a 
court-ordered discovery request, the Supreme Court ruled that a for-
eign litigant could not be subject to the consequences of noncompli-
ance as their noncompliance was the result of obeying the home 
                                                                                                             
 125 See Eustice, supra note 65, at 141. 
 126 PDPA, supra note 49, § 32. 
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country’s law.129 Further to that end, Section 442 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations (hereinafter, “Restatement”) requires 
that foreign litigants “make a good faith effort to secure permission 
from the foreign authorities to make the information available” 
whenever complying with a production order would subject them to 
civil or criminal penalties in their home country.130 It has been aptly 
stated that both the Restatement and the Hague Convention are ill-
suited in our ever-globalizing world.131 
D. Consequences of Noncompliance with U.S. Discovery 
Order. 
E-discovery has made cross-border discovery under the Restate-
ment and the Hague Convention nearly impossible because of the 
amount of information that can be stored electronically. Modern 
technology has allowed entities to maintain vast troves of data.132 
The more information that is stored, the more likely that a great 
number of individuals’ privacy rights will be affected. There is no 
doubt that pre-trial discovery can make or break many cases.133 On 
one hand, pre-trial discovery often acts as an incentive for parties to 
settle.134 When a company is faced with staggering discovery prices, 
it only seems logical that settlement may be less costly than litiga-
tion; however, if settlement is not an option and the foreign party is 
unable to comply with the discovery request, the Restatement sug-
gests that sanctions should not be applied when a good faith effort 
                                                                                                             
 129 See Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commer-
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has been made—but, courts can, and do, impose an adverse infer-
ence against the foreign party for noncompliance.135 Although the 
Restatement tries to protect foreign parties, U.S. courts can and do 
use their discretion to draw adverse inferences in a wide array of 
domestic litigation.136 An adverse inference can often be outcome-
determinative.  Because of this practice, it is clear that when a for-
eign entity files suit in the U.S. they will not be allowed to avail 
themselves of the data protection laws of their country. So, if an Ar-
gentine entity were to file a suit in the U.S. and hope for a favorable 
outcome, the entity is expected to produce discovery materials much 
to the same extent as it would be expected if it were located in the 
U.S.137 
U.S. courts are not hesitant to issue adverse inferences. For ex-
ample, the district court in Lyondell Citgo Refining issued an ad-
verse inference despite claims by the defendant that it had made a 
good faith effort to produce certain requested materials.138 Generally 
speaking, adverse inferences afford judges wide latitude in making 
decisions that certainly have a significant impact on a case’s out-
come. In fact, the standard of review for a judges’ pre-trial discovery 
motion is “clearly erroneous.”139 Courts have posited that the ad-
verse inference is “the necessary mechanism for restoring the evi-
dentiary balance.”140 In understanding the underlying purpose of an 
adverse inference, it is important to understand that “[t]he inference 
is adverse to the destroyer not because of any finding of moral cul-
pability, but because the risk that the evidence would have been det-
rimental rather than favorable should fall on the party responsible 
                                                                                                             
 135 See Restatement, supra note 127, § 442. 
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for its loss.”141 Foreign entities face the additional risk that if its law-
yers comply with U.S. discovery demands in violation of their do-
mestic laws, they may face criminal liability.142 Foreign litigators 
are forced to balance the costs and benefits between complying with 
U.S. discovery requests and violating the PDPA. If they comply 
with the discovery request, then they may be subject to criminal li-
ability and civil fines.143 On the other hand, if they refuse to comply 
with the discovery request, then they face the imposition of an ad-
verse inference, which may or may not be outcome-determinative to 
their case. Putting litigators in this case poses conflicting ethical ob-
ligations.144 In some instances, where only a fine may be imposed 
for a violation, then it may be worth the cost to violate the PDPA. 
Unfortunately, these determinations are not so clear and easy to 
make. It has often been difficult to determine when the APDPA will 
or will not enforce the PDPA.145 
V.     POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR EU-U.S. DISCOVERY PROBLEMS 
Attempting to solve cross-border discovery problems in Argen-
tina is no easy task. There are optimists that believe a solution is 
possible, only requiring some form of compromise,146 while there 
are others who believe that a solution is far beyond reach.147 Rather, 
they believe that only a series of protocols can help effectuate dis-
covery requests.148 It is unlikely that Argentina will ever fully com-
ply with U.S. discovery requests because Argentina, like the EU, has 
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 142 The French Supreme Court upheld the criminal conviction of a French law-
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differing opinions on privacy and data protection.149 With respect to 
discovery issues in the EU, many parties have tried to come up with 
a workable solution. 
There are at least three solutions that may help to create cross-
border discovery more predictable. One solution is to establish a 
committee that can determine specifically where the issues lie and 
then work with the legislature to reconcile them.150 The second so-
lution is to establish a series of procedures that entities can follow 
when faced with a U.S. discovery request.151 A third solution is to 
update the Hague Evidence Convention.152 It is worth mentioning 
that these solutions do not exist in a vacuum. Any one solution alone 
will not likely suffice. 
A. Establish a Working Party 
Following the implementation of the EU directive, the European 
Parliament established the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 
(“Working Party”).153 While the Working Party is not a solution in 
and of itself, it is tasked with the duty of finding solutions to cross-
border discovery obligations and has helped to highlight the is-
sues.154 Although discovery issues in the EU are slightly different 
than they are in Argentina, the Working Party’s solutions still pro-
vide a great deal of guidance. 
By finding solutions to cross-border discovery, the Working 
Party has to strike a balance between an individual’s right to their 
data and the “free movement of such data.”155 The Working Party 
has been granted advisory status and acts independently of the Eu-
ropean Parliament—essentially, it acts as an advisory committee.156 
In 2009, the Party released a paper titled, Working Document on 
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Pre-trial Discovery for Cross-Border Civil Litigation.157 The paper 
took notice of some of the struggles between the right to data privacy 
and the need to improve cross-border discovery.158 Specifically, the 
paper addressed: “Pre-emptive document preservation in anticipa-
tion of proceedings before U.S. courts or in response to requests for 
litigation hold, known as ‘freezing’ [and] pre-trial discovery re-
quests in U.S. civil litigation.”159 
Creating an organization similar to the Working Party would be 
a great starting point for solving the dilemma that currently affects 
the U.S. and Argentina. While there has been wide publication of 
sanctions imposed against U.S. companies operating in the EU, 
there has been little, if any, publication of companies being fined by 
the APDPA.160 Because there is little case law regarding U.S.-Ar-
gentina discovery problems, an advisory committee could help bring 
light to specific issues that will prove to be problematic going for-
ward. One suggestion by the Working Party is that “[o]nce personal 
data has been identified, the data controller would need to consider 
whether it is necessary for all of the personal data to be processed, 
or for example, could it be produced in an anonymous or redacted 
form.”161 This solution can be effective where the names of the data 
subjects are not specifically requested in pre-trial discovery, or 
where the names of the data subjects are not consequential to the 
discovery request. 
In its paper, the Working Party established guidelines after they 
appropriately recognized that data protection obligations do not co-
exist well with foreign discovery requirements.162 The Working 
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Party stated that because each level of discovery during litigation 
amounts to a processing of the data, there must be a justification at 
each stage.163 The Directive does not allow arbitrary processing.164 
In Europe, like in Argentina, data controllers are not permitted to 
retain personal data indefinitely in the anticipation of future litiga-
tion.165 This becomes problematic because the FRCP allows parties 
to send a discovery request to produce and permit the inspection of 
items in the responding party’s possession, custody, or control.166 
The Working Party suggests that so long as data controllers freeze 
the documents that they currently have in their possession, then they 
cannot be faulted.167 As long as data controllers retain information 
for short periods in abidance with local laws, they will not be vio-
lating any data protection laws, nor will they be violating any dis-
covery requests.168 Of course, this does not bode well for the party 
seeking the information because they will likely be seeking data 
from an earlier time; however, U.S. courts have held that the test to 
determine the production of documents is “control, not location.”169 
Control is the “the legal right to obtain [the] documents on de-
mand.”170 
If an entity receives a litigation hold, they are being asked to 
freeze the data. Essentially, the entity is being asked to process data, 
by retaining it longer than it otherwise would have.171 Under the EU 
directive, retaining data in the anticipation of future litigation 
amounts to a “processing.”172 Holding data for the “mere unsubstan-
tiated possibility” that a lawsuit will be filed is not enough to pass 
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muster under EU laws.173 There is no reason to suspect that this 
would be any different in Argentina. Under the FRCP, failure to pre-
serve, in and of itself, opens a party up to sanctions.174 In fact, the 
most common type of discovery sanction is the failure to preserve 
ESI.175 Recognizing that Argentina’s data privacy is comparable to 
that in the EU, the Working Party’s resolution helps to provide guid-
ance to Argentina-U.S. discovery issues. “The Working Party rec-
ognizes that the parties involved in litigation have a legitimate inter-
est in accessing information that is necessary to make or defend a 
claim, but this must be balanced with the rights of the individual 
whose personal data is being sought.”176 
The Working Party makes many valid suggestions that can help 
entities embroiled in U.S. discovery comply with Argentina data 
protection laws without ignoring a discovery request. As previously 
mentioned, the Working Party is neither the solution, nor the end-
game. 
B. The Sedona Conference 
The Sedona Conference Journal has been one of the foremost 
authorities on U.S. discovery practices and its conflict with Euro-
pean and Latin American data protection laws.177 The Conference 
has published resources on a wide array of e-discovery issues. 
Among other significant publications, the Conference published 
several papers that address cross-border discovery. One paper in 
particular, published in June 2011, addressed the discovery issues 
that face multinational corporations.178 The paper provided practical 
considerations and protocols.179 By doing so, it focused on making 
multinationals prepared to handle the task of cross border discovery 
obligations.180 Although the paper provides guidance in reference to 
multinationals, the guidance and solutions can be applied to nearly 
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any entity operating in Argentina that potentially faces U.S. discov-
ery obligations. 
The paper addresses four organizational challenges that multi-
nationals face when dealing with cross-border discovery: (1) getting 
e-discovery experts on board early in the process; (2) educating and 
working together with opposing counsel; (3) the presence of addi-
tional time-consuming measures; and (4) fully complying with the 
discovery request.181 Acknowledging these challenges before facing 
a discovery request may help, but it is ultimately self-defeating to 
think that one could satisfy both U.S. laws and Argentine laws.182 
Multinational companies faced with the task of complying with 
U.S. discovery obligations would be wise to hire an e-discovery ex-
pert as soon as possible.183 This is important because understanding 
where discoverable data is located and how to process it efficiently 
is absolutely necessary in order to comply with a discovery request 
promptly. It is suggested that multinationals would suffer if they re-
lied solely on advice from U.S. trial lawyers when anticipating a 
discovery request.184 By hiring in-house e-discovery experts, a mul-
tinational can maintain consistency in processing and addressing 
U.S. discovery requests.185 For companies that are large enough, it 
may be cost-effective to create an e-discovery department.186 An e-
discovery team, it is suggested, can create a standardized process 
that is implemented company-wide.187 
The second challenge requires that foreign entities educate their 
employees on the U.S. discovery requests and working with oppos-
ing counsel.188 A simple solution to this challenge would be to meet 
and confer in the hopes that opposing counsel is receptive to the 
challenges that the defendant is facing.189 
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A solution to the third challenge, which is closely related to the 
second, requires that a discovery schedule is created so that both 
parties can understand the complexity of cross-border discovery in 
their respective situation.190 
Lastly, the fourth challenge requires that multinationals keep in 
touch with the latest technical capabilities of filtering through dis-
coverable data.191 The benefits to this solution are twofold: multina-
tionals can efficiently filter through personal and sensitive data, and 
they can do so in a timely manner. 
Beyond the organizational challenges facing multinationals, the 
paper addresses conditions that must be met in order for multina-
tionals to come to a solution with opposing counsel.192 The first con-
dition is that multinationals need to have the same willingness to 
comply with U.S. discovery requests as U.S.-based corporations 
do.193 European and Latin American entities are not as accustomed 
to e-discovery and its staggering prices.194 U.S. lawyers are more 
aware of the penalties for failure to follow U.S. discovery re-
quests.195 Entities in Europe or Latin American may need to acquire 
the same “willingness” in order for some solution to be found.196 In 
order to encourage this elusive concept of “willingness,” there will 
need to be more at stake than the fear of penalties or sanctions. For-
eign litigators need to understand that U.S. discovery is, arguably, 
the most significant phase in litigation, and failure to cooperate with 
opposing counsel can result in an unfavorable outcome. 
A workable solution for cross-border discovery is said to rest on 
three prerequisites: (1) parties must be willing to disclose all infor-
mation allowed by applicable law; (2) foreign entities must be pre-
pared if there is any risk at all of being called upon to produce ma-
terials; and (3) parties must familiarize themselves with their oppo-
nent.197 
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Two additional prerequisites can be added to this list. First, Eu-
ropean and Latin American entities must have the ability to under-
take a discovery request. E-discovery, being relatively new for 
some, requires a special level of expertise in handling, sourcing, and 
transferring data.198 U.S. courts have come to expect that parties are 
capable of handling a request, especially if it is a larger entity.199 It 
is possible that U.S. courts are willing to be more lenient with 
smaller foreign entities, but that is no certainty. Courts are unlikely 
to be lenient towards a smaller entity because it is too tedious to 
determine who is worthy of leniency. Consequently, this ad-hoc ap-
proach is impractical: it is both time-consuming and costly. When 
should a court decide to give leniency to a foreign entity? Should 
the court review the entity’s financial statements in order to ascer-
tain whether the entity is in a position to handle a cross-border dis-
covery request? Thus, foreign entities should not expect to receive 
any judicial leeway once a discovery request is made. 
The second additional prerequisite can be labeled “civility.”200 
In this context, being civil requires that one understands the oppos-
ing party.201 In the absence of civility, entities will either make ri-
diculous discovery demands or will refuse to cooperate at all. For 
there to be a workable solution in conducting discovery with foreign 
entities, both sides need to communicate regularly.202 Even if both 
sides come to the realization that some data is not transferrable be-
cause it implicates a data protection law, a lack of civility will likely 
enrage the party seeking the data, making them more likely to seek 
a court-ordered discovery request. The violation of such a court or-
der may result in sanctions or an adverse inference. 
C. Modernizing the Hague Evidence Convention 
The next solution focuses entirely on the Hague Evidence Con-
vention. Perhaps we need to see if the Convention is salvageable. 
Modernizing the Convention would require that it be brought into 
the reality of a world dominated by ESI-centered discovery. In order 
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to modernize the Convention, there are at least four recommenda-
tions to put forward. The first is to create an amendment that will 
establish a clear meaning of pre-trial discovery.203 The second is to 
establish a minimum data protection standard, modeled after the 
United Kingdom’s Model Letter of Request.204 The third and fourth 
recommendations are to allow bilateral treaties among countries and 
to place the burden of issuing Letters of Request on the Convention, 
rather than the countries in which evidence is requested.205 
It is argued that because so many countries were unfamiliar with 
pre-trial discovery at the time the Convention was created, many of 
them blindly signed Article 23 limiting reservations.206 It has been 
discovered that some countries that signed an Article 23 limiting 
reservation were under the impression that “pre-trial” discovery 
meant that discovery would take place before a claim was filed.207 
Perhaps those countries feared what they did not understand. It is 
suggested that civil law countries now have a better understanding 
of the scope of pre-trial discovery in the U.S.208 It is possible that 
those countries that previously misunderstood pre-trial discovery 
may now be willing to rescind their Article 23 limiting reservation. 
If pre-trial discovery is as efficient and effective as it is claimed 
to be, why would foreign countries not want to participate? One rea-
son could be that even with foreign countries understanding what 
pre-trial discovery is, allowing foreign entities to engage in it will 
still result in the same potential data violations. Whether the data is 
provided early or late in the litigation, it is still being provided; how-
ever, if foreign countries, like Argentina and EU members, were to 
get a better understanding of pre-trial discovery, and if the U.S. es-
tablished minimum data protection standards, then there may be a 
different outcome. Modernizing the Convention may take as much 
work as rewriting it. 
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D. The Problem May Be Local Instead of Global. 
Globalization can only work if there is give and take, and it re-
quires active and well-guided government action.209 That is, to make 
globalization work efficiently, countries must accept certain active 
government involvement so that they can enjoy certain protectionist 
benefits.210 Whether or not that is a perfect system is beyond the 
scope of this paper. In order for countries and multinational corpo-
rations to continue conducting business on a global scale, there 
needs to be a more unified system of cross-border discovery. Many 
of the previously mentioned solutions placed the focus on foreign 
countries. Is the U.S. to blame for these cross-border discovery di-
lemmas? It is possible that the problem does not lie within the EU 
or Argentina, but rather the problem lies within the U.S. One solu-
tion is that the U.S. should heighten its level of data protection and 
data privacy laws to that of the EU and Argentina.211 Another solu-
tion is that U.S. courts need to be more cognizant of discovery under 
the PDPA and the EU Directive. Going one step further, courts may 
need to assess the value of a case-by-case basis in determining the 
merits of compelling discovery from a foreign entity. This last solu-
tion may assume that the judiciary must step in and reconcile the 
issue because it is unlikely that the U.S. legislature will heighten its 
data protection laws. 
One could argue that U.S. pre-trial discovery requests are a cost 
of conducting business in the U.S. Should a foreign party produce 
documents and just pay fines if that means that they will not be sub-
ject to an adverse inference in a U.S. court? Essentially, the foreign 
party is forced to make a cost-benefit analysis.212 Parties are forced 
to determine whether the costs of violating Argentine data protec-
tion laws are outweighed by the benefit that following a discovery 
request offers. Should it be in the policy of U.S. courts to incentivize 
entities to break foreign laws if that means benefiting a U.S. litigant 
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by allowing them to view the documents they requested? If the pen-
alties for violating data protection laws in Argentina were nominal, 
then the choice to produce materials does not require any more dis-
cussion; however, because the penalties can be severe, it is not an 
easy choice. On the other hand, if the foreign party is availing itself 
of the protections and benefits of U.S. laws while conducting busi-
ness, should it be allowed to shield itself under data protection laws 
of Argentina? U.S. courts have realized that some entities use the 
laws of foreign countries to protect themselves.213 In Columbia Pic-
tures, a California district court reiterated the position articulated in 
Aerospatiale and held that foreign statutes do not prevent a court 
from ordering a party to produce evidence.214   
Quite possibly, the biggest impediment to the Hague Evidence 
Convention is Aerospatiale.215 It has been suggested that perhaps in 
order to make the give-and-take system of globalization work, the 
U.S. should overturn Aerospatiale so that the Hague Evidence Con-
vention is not wholly useless.216 Would a gesture, such as overturn-
ing Aerospatiale, convince civil law countries that we are willing to 
compromise? Unlikely. If data privacy is as fundamental a right as 
it is claimed to be, then overturning Aerospatiale is enough to bring 
about change. 
Conceptually, international treaties tend to take a one-size-fits-
all approach to solving issues that affect scores of countries. This is 
problematic for obvious reasons. Every country—and every culture 
for that matter—has a unique view. Data privacy and cross-border 
discovery are no exception to this phenomenon. The fact that many 
countries have not signed limiting reservations to the Hague Evi-
dence Convention shows that not all countries are opposed to the 
use of pre-trial discovery Letters of Request. Even if countries were 
unfamiliar with pre-trial discovery upon becoming a party to the 
Convention, they still may be disinclined to allow discovery re-
quests. Again, to distinguish, common law countries and civil law 
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countries have different procedures for conducting discovery. In 
civil law countries, judges often conduct discovery.217 
VI.     CONCLUSION 
Despite guidelines and protocols to cross-border discovery, any 
solution to the problem between the U.S. and Argentina will require 
some compromise between the two countries. After looking at the 
European model and the issues that are created by the EU directive, 
it seems clear that the U.S. and Argentina need to work together in 
finding a solution that is unique to each countries’ needs. A one-
size-fits-all approach is not likely to be helpful because each coun-
try’s views on data privacy are as unique as an individual’s finger-
print. 
What makes cross-border discovery in Argentina especially dif-
ficult is that its data protection laws are almost unpredictable. In or-
der to solve the discovery disputes between the U.S. and Argentina, 
at least three conditions must be met: (1) Argentine law makers must 
make violations of data protection law clearer; (2) U.S. courts needs 
to recognize that data privacy needs to be respected; and (3) U.S. 
courts should only apply sanctions and penalties in egregious situa-
tions. Argentine authorities need to clarify their willingness to com-
ply with their own laws. If Argentine litigators are not fearful of be-
ing reprimanded for violating Argentine data protection laws, then 
the discussion does not need to go any further. 
As the NSA’s vast surveillance program has come to light re-
cently, the EU has been increasingly reluctant to negotiate with the 
U.S. regarding trade.218 U.S. courts need to be more accepting of the 
fact that data privacy is a fundamental right in Argentina, and that it 
is not a malleable concept that can be used for the benefit of U.S. 
litigants. 
Lastly, U.S. courts should avoid using adverse inferences when 
foreign litigants are complying with foreign data privacy laws. Such 
sanctions should be reserved for egregious violations; for example, 
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when parties intentionally retain discoverable materials because of 
its damaging nature. 
